Semi-cooperative games in strategic form are considered in which either a negotiation among the n players determines their actions or else an arbitrator specifies them. Methods are presented for selecting such action profiles by using multiple-objective optimization techniques. In particular, a scalar equilibrium (SE) is an action profile for the n players that maximize a utility function over the acceptable joint actions. Thus the selection of "solutions" to the game involves the selection of an acceptable utility function. In a greedy SE, the goal is to assign individual actions giving each player the largest payoff jointly possible. In a compromise SE, the goal is to make individual player payoffs equitable, while a satisficing SE achieves a target payoff level while weighting each player for possible additional payoff. These SEs are formally defined and shown to be Pareto optimal over the acceptable joint actions of the players. The advantage of these SEs is that they involve only pure strategies that are easily computed. Examples are given, including some well-known coordination games, and the worst-case time complexity for obtaining these SEs is shown to be linear in the number of individual payoffs in the payoff matrix. Finally, the SEs of this paper are checked against some standard game-theoretic bargaining axioms.
Introduction
Game theory is the study of strategic interactions among n rational decision makers called agents (or players), whose decisions affect each other. Its systematic development began with von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] , who described both non-cooperative and cooperative games. These categories have become one approach for classifying games [2] . Either type involves a solution concept to recommend, predict, or explain player choices. Depending on the use of these solutions, game theory can be also divided into normative, predictive, and descriptive branches. The normative use of game theory is to recommend ideal decisions that the participants should make in a given game. The predictive application is to predict the choices of the participants. On the other hand, descriptive game theory, which involves empirical data, attempts to explain the actual behavior of these decision makers. Of course, both classification schemes are inexact. For example, in the latter taxonomy, the normative, predictive, and descriptive uses are interrelated. Descriptive game theory can lead to better mathematical model that give better recommendations and predictions. However, some decision theorists-including von Neumann [1] , Savage [3] , and Aumann [4] -believe that the principal use of game theory is normative.
The purpose of this paper is to present normative models for games with both cooperative and noncooperative aspects. In each model, all players are assumed to have the same notion of rationality, which differs among the models. Solutions to each model are obtained by solving a scalar optimization problem to avoid the difficulties associated with the usual game theoretic equilibria. Moreover, these solutions involve only pure strategies. The models developed here could also be used by an arbitrator to prescribe an action profile for the game. In this section, we will first summarize the basic ideas of both non-cooperative and cooperative games. Next, we review the literature on games with both competitive and cooperative aspects, including that on arbitration for such decision problems. Then the restriction of our solutions to pure strategies will be discussed, and finally the notion of a scalar equilibrium will be defined.
Modern game theory as described in Myerson [5] and Maschler et al. [6] is predominantly non-cooperative. A non-cooperative game involves two or more utility-maximizing players. The key feature is that it focuses on the actions of the individual players. Non-cooperative game theory requires the solution concept to be a Nash equilibrium [7] [8] [9] . In other words, rational players are considered selfish. They act in their individual self-interest in the sense that each player's strategy would maximize his expected payoff for the strategy profile of the other 1 n − players. Thus in a Nash equilibrium (NE) no player can improve his expected payoff by unilaterally changing his pure or mixed strategy. A NE always exists in mixed strategies but may not be Pareto optimal. Moreover, there may be multiple pure or mixed NEs in which various refinements such as properness have been proposed to eliminate implausible equilibria.
Social dilemmas [10] [11] [12] illustrate that the selfish behavior manifested in NEs may conflict with group or team interests. In Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, each player can do better by cooperating. To accommodate these situations, Berge [13] proposed a pure-strategy solution that was formalized by Zhukovskiy [14] . A Berge equilibrium (BE) is a pure strategy profile in which every 1 n − players choose strategies that maximize the remaining player's payoff. For a game with unselfish players invoking this Golden Rule rationale, a BE is thus an equilibrium since no unilateral change of strategy by any player can improve another player's payoff. Such mutual support has been studied in Colman [15] , Corley and Kwain [16] , Corley [17] , and the references therein. The mixed BE is called a dual equilibrium to the NE in the latter two references because of the duality discussed there. Regardless, with this interpretation a pure or mixed BE can be considered as a mutually cooperative or altruistic solution concept for non-cooperative games when each player's goal is to help the remaining players as opposed to himself. However, the BE is a solution concept for non-cooperative games since it is each player's individual choice to be altruistic as above. Moreover, the players are rational in the following sense: a person is rational if the person makes decisions and acts in a manner consistent with his or her stated objective. In the BE model, it is assumed that each player's objective is to be mutually supportive if possible.
In contrast, cooperative (or coalitional) game theory focuses on groups of the n players, rather than individual players themselves. Players form coalitions in cooperative games so that the members can receive more benefit than they could individually. Cooperative game theory focuses on predicting the coalitions that will form, the joint actions the coalitions will take, the resulting collective payoffs, and the binding agreements the coalitions will make [18] . Given this information, the cooperative model is concerned with identifying a fair allocation of benefits to the n players. Different solution concepts for cooperative games define fairness differently and thus assign different payoffs to the individual players.
Common solution concepts include the stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] , the Shapley value [19] , and the core of Gillies [20] , as well as the kernel of Davis and Maschler [21] and the nucleolus of Schmeidler [22] .
The essential difference between non-cooperative and cooperative game theory is that non-cooperative games focus on what individuals can do acting alone while cooperative games focus on what groups can accomplish if they work together. Contracts must be self-enforcing in non-cooperative games, whereas players can make enforceable contracts in cooperative games. However, the contracts in cooperative games are not enforced internally, but externally by an outside party such as an arbitrator. In this paper a class of hybrid games in strategic form, with aspects of both non-cooperative and cooperative games, are called semi-cooperative. They may involve either negotiation by the players or external arbitration.
An early example of such a game was considered by Nash [23] , who presents a unique solution for a two-person bargaining problem in strategic form with More recently treatments of semi-cooperative games includes Baccharch et al. [28] , who consider a team reasoning approach to strategic games in which the players make decisions best for their team of players and not simply themselves.
Hart and Mas-Colell [29] studied cooperation in n-person strategic-form games and developed a multistage bargaining procedure based on proposer commitment to obtain a ubgame-perfect equilibria that approaches Pareto efficiency.
Diskin et al. [30] extended Raiffa's arbitration model to an iterative procedure that converges to a Pareto optimum of the bargaining set for n players. Cao [31] modified the Hart-Colell procedure by delaying the realization of all threats to end of the game so that the Hart-Colell procedure would be consistent with the min-max solution in two-person zero-sum games. Finally, for two-person strategic-form games Kalai and Kalai [32] proposed a solution concept for cooperation called the cooperative-competitive (or coco) value. Their approach was developed either as a bargaining solution or for an arbitrator to obtain fair mixed strategies to a two-person in strategic form. This coco value combines the two players' payoff matrices into a max-max cooperative component as well as a max-min competitive one. An extensive literature survey of semi-cooperative games is also provided.
We next justify seeking only pure strategies here by describing the difficulties with mixed strategies. Historically, according to both von Neumann [1] and later Nash [24] , a randomizing process is an essential ingredient in the concept of a mixed strategy. According to Nash [24] , "the use of mixed strategies involves deliberate decisions to randomize, to decide between alternative possibilities by using a randomizing process involving specified probabilities." However, Aumann [4] considered the concept of mixed strategies to be "intuitively problematic" since people rarely make decision choices by lottery. [34] . The basic idea behind purification is that a mixed strategy merely reflects a player's lack of knowledge of the other players' information and decision-making process. In this view, random choices are seen as consequences of non-specified, payoff-irrelevant exogeneous factors, which to Rubenstein was unsatisfactory. Rubenstein's second interpretation considers the game players standing for a large population of agents with n subpopulations, the members of which habitually choose specific actions, i.e., pure strategies. In other words, the fractions of the whole population choosing different strategies resembles a mixed strategy. But then, Rubenstein argued, no reason is provided for the individual agents' choices. An alternate interpretation, perhaps the most intuitive, is that the probability of a player choosing a given action in a mixed strategy is the fraction of time that player would choose to it in a long series of repeated games. Unfortunately, games are often not repeated and certainly not enough for a frequentist interpretation of probability. Hence, Aumann and Brandenburger [35] interpret a mixed strategy for player i as an representation of the beliefs of i's opponents about the action that player i will choose. However, opponents will likely have different beliefs, especially if they have different notions of rationality, so the predictive power of a mixed strategy is limited since a Nash equilibrium becomes an equilibrium in beliefs rather than actions.
Thus the interpretation of mixed strategies is controversial. The principal advantage of mixed strategies seems to be theoretical. They provide NEs when none exist in pure strategies and allow for the development of a rich mathematical theory as opposed to a combinatorial one. Nonetheless, practitioners are frequently ambivalent towards mixed strategies, which are currently difficult (if not impossible) to compute except for a relatively small games. Moreover, practitioners often view the mixed strategy solution concept as incomplete since it does not specify why and how players randomize their decisions.
In view of the above discussion, this paper develops pure-strategy solution concepts for n-person, strategic-form, semi-cooperative games with complete information and no threats. The solutions are normative since that they are suggestions for assigning action profiles to the players, under the assumptions of the models. Each is the pure-strategy solution to a scalar optimization problem. For the semi-cooperative games described above, a scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined as an assignment of actions to the players using a decision criterion that maximizes an appropriate utility function of the players' payoff profiles over the players' acceptable joint actions. This choice of this utility function would be the result of a binding agreement among the players or an arbitrator's decision. It is designated an equilibrium only in the sense that no player would change his action because the agreement or the arbitrator. In other words, for an n-person, strategic-form game, the agreed-upon utility function T associates a scalar value to each payoff profile in the payoff matrix. A payoff profile with a maximum utility is considered an optimal action profile. In the case of ties, an action profile would be chosen according to secondary criteria, which are not studied here.
As an agreement among the players, an SE could be either externally or internally enforceable. In the case of a treaty, for example, an external enforcement mechanism could be an international court, while an internal enforcement mechanism could be a war or trade sanctions. In an arbitration, the arbitrator would obviously be the enforcement mechanism. An SE need not be a NE or a BE.
A semi-cooperative game as considered here has both competitive and cooperative aspects. It is competitive in the sense that each player wants a good payoff, possibly meaning either a fair one or a large one. It is reasonable to assume that no player would agree to an action profile giving him less than his pure-strategy security level. Nor-as argued by Aumann [38] , Rubinstein [33] , and Bacharach et al. [28] -would reasonable players accept a payoff profile that was Pareto dominated. Otherwise, there would be an alternate profile for which some players' payoffs would be improved without diminishing any player's. On the other hand, the games of this paper are also cooperative in the sense that ideally an agreement among the players is required to select T. The goal here is to reduce such semi-cooperative games to the selection of a reasonable T either by the players or by an arbitrator if the players are unable to reach an agreement.
Such a T would then determine the players' actions, and thus the approach is normative.
In summary, the SE approach extends the classic bargaining results of (23), (36) , and (37), for example, to n players and to different decision criteria. It also restricts previous results for semi-cooperative games to the more difficult and practical problem of obtaining pure strategies. In particular, the SE approach addresses four problematic areas of non-cooperative game theory.
1) An SE, which always exists, assigns a specific action to each player, as opposed to a mixed strategy that is difficult to calculate, interpret, and implement.
2) An SE can be obtained quickly as the maximum of a finite number of scalar values, as opposed to the computational effort required to determine mixed strategy NEs. A particular T might yield an approximation to a mixed NE or BE.
In the latter case, even a mixed BE may not exist (17 lected by the players. For example, a "rational" action profile could be one that gives each player a "fair" payoff relative to all the players. Another could model the team concept of Bacharach et al. [28] . T would capture the players' notions of rationality, which could conceivably differ, though this possibility is not considered in this paper.
4) For games with multiple NEs or BEs, one could also use T to refine these equilibria and choose one with the highest feasible value of T.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary notation, definitions, and results. In Section 3 we develop the greedy SE (GSE), establish that a GSE is Pareto optimal for a semi-cooperative game in strategic form, and present two-person examples including the coordination games Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken games to compare the GSE with other solution concepts. In addition, it is shown that a GSE is computationally tractable. In Section 4 we define a compromise SE and then a satisficing SE in Section 5. Both are again Pareto optimal and computationally tractable, and examples are presented. In Section 6 we state some standard bargaining axioms and note those satisfied by the SEs here. In Section 8 we offer conclusions.
Preliminaries
Consider first a standard n-person, non-cooperative game in strategic form for pure strategies. Let 
, , n u s u s u s =  ordered in the usual way. It is well known that VMN utilities are both ordinal and cardinal but that these utilities are usually incomparable between players. In other words, for any strategies
We assume here that n G is a TU game with transferable utilities. This assumption means that the players have a common currency, or numeraire, valued equally by all players and that there is no wealth effect. Thus all players derive the same utility for the same currency level. In such a currency (i.e., dollars), it follows that the players have quasi-linear utility functions in ( )
Furthermore, we assume that utilities for player i , i I ∀ ∈ , have been standar- β , which yield an equivialent game [5] , so that each player's VNM utility for $C is C utils and that a difference of one util is as significant for any player as any other. We call this Assumption U on the utilities. u Ω as described in [40] . In particular, for all ,
We next maximize the aggregate utility function
over Ω according to this preference relation and assign actions profiles to the players based on this decision criterion. Such an approach is consistent in the sense that T ≤ is complete and transitive. An SE is now formally defined. 
If n Γ has multiple SEs resulting from ties in the maximization, it is assumed that a negotiation among the players, similar to the one stipulating T and Ω , will choose a single * s . If the game n Γ is arbitrated, the arbitrator will select , T Ω , and a single SE. A further significant application of the SE approach is the use as a refinement mechanism for multiple equilibria of n G . For example, Ω 
Thus s * is not an SE for n Γ to establish the result.
Greedy Scalar Equilibrium
It is now assumed that each player is greedy and wants a payoff as high as jointly 
Because of Assumption U, the multiplication in (1) defines a reasonable aggregate utility function G T u  on Ω . The number 1 in the denominators of (1) prevents a division by 0 if any
Definition 3.1. The pure strategy profile s * is a GSE for n Γ if and only if s * maximizes the aggregate utility function
over Ω . From Definition 3.1, a GSE always exists even though a pure NE modeling player selfishness may not. Moreover, from (3.1), it follows that , a b and if Figure 2 were recalculated, then the scalar value ( ) 0.25
, a b is not a GSE, and no BE is a GSE and vice versa. is the unique GSE, which is not an NE. However, it is the unique BE. Thus in this example, ( )
, a b is both a greedy and mutually supportive action profile. Being mutually supportive in PD is better for each player than being selfish in the sense of an NE.
Example 3.6. For 1 3 x < < , Figure 5 is the payoff matrix of a Hawk-Dove game 2 G in which two countries vie for a contested resource. The Hawk pure strategy involves an escalated fight or even war for the resource, while the Dove pure strategy eschews such a fight. When 1 3 Step 3. For each of the possible
Step 4. Find the action profiles * s S ∈ that maximize
Step 3. The worst-case time complexity of obtaining all GSEs for n Γ is now shown to be linear in the size of the input data. Recall that in the standard Random Access Machine (RAM) model [41] , each addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, replacement, if statement, and call is considered to take one time step. Step 2 has complexity ( ) O nM as established by Blum et al. [42] . et al. [43] . A similar result holds for BEs [44] . However, finding a mixed NE is a PPAD-complete problem [45] , a different type of complexity than NP-completeness but still a strong evidence for intractability [46] .
Compromise Scalar Equilibrium
Now assume now that each player wants a fair payoff or compromise as compared with the other players. Again, because of Assumption U, a reasonable notion of fairness is proposed as a compromise semi-cooperative equilibrium (CSE)
for n Γ , which is defined in a manner similar to Definition 3. between the players' selfishness and unselfishness. A CE differs substantially from the fairness equilibrium of Rabin [47] for two players and from other notions of fairness in Korth [48] . However,
 could be considered as a discrete analog to the Nash product for the two-person bargaining problem [23] . More precisely, [49] . Γ is shown in Figure 7 . Thus ( )
, a b is the unique CSE, which is not an NE but is a BE.
Example 4.4. Consider again the Hawk-Dove of Figure 5 with associated compromise scalar matrix in Figure 8 . Now ( )
, a b is the unique CSE for 1.7321 3 x < < , which gives a larger range on x for avoiding war by compromise than by greed as in Example 3.6.
Satisficing Scalar Equilibrium
Aspiration levels are widely used in decision theory [50] [51] and will be used here in a satisficing scalar equilibrium (SSE) unrelated to the satisficing games of Stirling [52] . The SSE achieves four objectives. 2) The SSE model focuses the players or arbitrator on the parameters i p and 
, , , , , 
is an SSE and Pareto maximal for n Γ . Proof. Let 0, 
Axiomatic Considerations
A set of standard axioms for bargaining solutions will now be applied to the semi-cooperative models studied here. Nash [23] formulated by Kalai [37] . We add Axiom 6, which seems reasonable. 
Axiom 1 (Pareto Efficiency

Conclusion
The normative SE approach presented here extends classical bargaining models to semi-cooperative games with alternate decision criteria for the players or an arbitrator. In effect, this paper attempts to reduce the negotiations of semicooperative games to the new approach of selecting an appropriate utility function T, of which three were offered. It also restricts previous work to the pure strategies actually required for implementation. In doing so, an SE can be obtained quickly as the maximum of a finite number of scalar values, as opposed to the computational effort required to determine mixed equilibria. Future work should focus on formulating utility functions T that would model decision criteria besides the greedy, compromise, and satisficing ones presented in this paper. The next step would then be to form an aggregate utility function T by combining individual utility functions for players with different notions of rationality.
